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The increased threat from Warsaw Pact forces combined with
recognition of the inability of NATO forces to cooperate fully
in combat has caused emphasis to be placed on standardization
of equipment, procedures, and tactics. The Conference of
National Armaments Directors (CNAD] and the Military Agency
for Standardization (MAS) are the NATO organizations tasked
with implementation of standardization. The CNAD concerns it-
self primarily with requirements determination. The MAS
develops NATO-wide agreements at a low system level. Neither
organization is concerned with the total system life cycle nor
does an effective user-producer dialogue exist. A systems
approach is presented as a rational way of making standardiza-
tion decisions. A hierarchy of standardization and a system
design model are described as methodologies for decision-
making. Alternative ways of implementing the systems approach
are examined using the system design model. A recommendation
is made to establish a systems engineering activity, within
CNAD, to direct and coordinate all standardization activities.
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"It is the policy of the United States that
equipment procured for the use of personnel of the
Armed Forces of the United States stationed in Europe
under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty should
be standardized or at least interoperable with equip-
ment of other members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization [Ref. 1]."
This statement, made by Congress as a part of the 1976
Defense Appropriation Act, set the stage leading to the
current emphasis by the U.S. and NATO on standardization of
equipment, weapons, procedures, tactics, and doctrine.
Standardization is not a new concept. It has been a NATO
objective since NATO was formed. Even so, the NATO nations
have had a history of going their separate ways with regard
to equipping their forces and working out tactics and pro-
cedures. This has caused the combat capability of the
combined forces to be less than it should be. According to
General Andrew Goodpaster (ret.), former Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (SACEUR)
:
"We are not getting a satisfactory return on our
investment for our vast expenditures; we are losing
at least 30 percent and in some areas 50 percent of
our capability due to lack of standardization
[Ref. 2, p. 212] ."
It has been determined that the NATO allied combat forces
employ [Ref. 3, p. 6]:
.23 different types of combat aircraft
.7 different types of main battle tanks
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.8 different types of armored personnel carriers
.22 different types of anti-tank weapons
Even the Allied Mobile Force, a quick-reaction, highly
maneuverable combat force composed of troops and equipment
of seven nations uses:
. 7 different types of combat aircraft
.6 different types of recoiless rifles
.4 different types of wire guided missiles
.3 different types each of mortars, rifles, and machine
guns
The net effect of this is higher acquisition costs, duplica-
tion of logistics support, and reduced ability of forces to
support each other.
Only within the last several years has there been a
growing alliance-wide recognition that the need to achieve
standardization is urgent. Indeed, the policy of achieving
standardization within the NATO forces is receiving the
highest level support within the U.S. This is evidenced
by statements made by President Carter to a meeting of NATO
Defense Ministers in London on May 10, 1977:
M
....I hope that European and the North American
members of the Alliance will join in exploring ways
to improve cooperation in the development, produc-
tion, and procurement of defense equipment....
Together we should look for ways to standardize
our equipment and make sure it can be used by all
allied forces [Ref. 4]."
Standardization of weapons and related support procedures
and tactics is clearly the policy of the United States as
well as the rest of NATO.
11

Over the last several years much has been said about how
the NATO nations should collaborate in the standardization
of arms and related systems. Very little has been done to
achieve specific means of implementation of the guiding
principles or policy. Many people throughout NATO say,
"What we should do," but few are saying, "How we should
do it."
Establishing policy has been a necessary step in the
evolution of increasing standardization. Without high level
guidance, those charged with the responsibility for imple-
mentation are forced to set their own goals and objectives.
It is not very likely, under those circumstances, that every-
one would be moving in the same direction. However, the
policy has been well established and most of the concerned
organizations and individuals have accepted increased NATO
standardization as a goal worth spending time and effort on.
The next step in the process is to implement the policy with
specific standardization plans and programs.
B. PURPOSE OF THE THESIS
There are many ways to establish plans and programs.
Some ways are certainly more effective than others. The
NATO organizations have not taken a well organized approach
to making standardization decisions. Implementation, where
it even exists, has tended to react to some of the most
critical armament standardization deficiencies without look-
ing to the overall system life cycle.
12

It is the purpose of this thesis to develop and present
a rational systems approach to making standardization decisions
over the entire system life cycle. This approach is then
compared with current methods used for standardization.
Problem areas are defined, alternative solutions are pre-
sented, and recommendations are offered.
C. RESEARCH METHOD
The research method used in this thesis is illustrated
in Figure 1. Four basic tasks were conducted as described
below:
.Task 1 - A study was conducted to determine the basic
definitions of the systems approach including detailed
methodologies suitable to aid in making standardization
decisions. Definitions of standardization terms, used
throughout NATO, were examined and a classification scheme
was developed to relate the terms to each other.
.Task 2 - Current NATO approaches to standardization
decision-making were reviewed in detail. A brief history
of past approaches and reasons for their failures was in-
cluded in this review.
.Task 3 - The results of tasks 1 and 2 were compared to
determine those areas in which the current NATO methods
matched the systems approach and those areas where they did
not. The latter areas were identified as deficiencies
which need to be resolved in order to most effectively









CO X CJ aSU < a,
w o a.
nw(v!<;2 MOOiO 00 2 Cu CO
h-» W < < SH XX WX E- U O H
»-} 2 H COO >-< O <>*













tt. E-» co2 O < >*
o 2 CO
CO CO X
HH -» 2 cq cj
as co cq X <
< >- «4 H O
a. J S asS < H a a.O 2: pq 2 PU




















.Task 4 - Task 4 was a synthesis of alternative possible
solutions to the deficiencies in current approaches identi-
fied in task 3. Development of the alternative solutions
was accomplished using the systems approach described in
task 1.
A number of different sources of information were used
in developing this thesis. In brief summary, they consisted
of books and articles in the open literature, terms of
reference and other NATO documents, Department of Defense
directives and reports (formal and informal) , and discussions
with a number of persons involved in NATO standardization,
both in Department of Defense and U.S. Congress. The list
of references cites some of the most important documents
used. A review of the documents will give the reader a more
complete background on the problems and future of NATO
standardization and will be a valuable supplement to this
thesis. Most of these documents are available from the
various agencies as identified in the list of references.
15
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II. THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPROACH
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the systems engineering approach
and its applications to NATO standardization. A definition
of related terms is made. These terms are structured in
a standardization hierarchy model. The general definition
of a systems approach is then made along with applications
to the standardization issue. Tactical aircraft (TACAIR)
systems are presented throughout this chapter to demonstrate
definitions and concepts.
B. STANDARDIZATION DEFINITIONS
One of the principal difficulties in establishing a
common baseline is the understanding of the terms and ex-
pressions used in defining the standardization issues. In
some cases, terms have tended to be used interchangeably
to define the same thing. In other cases, the meaning of
certain expressions is vague and subject to differences in
interpretation. It is the purpose of this section to sort
out these definitions and to establish a common basis for
their application. Most of the definitions given here have
been approved by the Department of Defense Steering Group




Rationalization and standardization are general expressions
which, in slightly different ways, describe the unification of
NATO forces. Compatibility, interoperability, interchange-
ability, and commonality are expressions which refer to
varying degrees of standardization. Rationalization is a
high level policy term which will be described here for the
sake of completeness but will not be discussed further.
Those terms marked by an asterisk have also been approved by
NATO and are included in the NATO Glossary of Terms and
Definitions for Military Use [Ref. 5, p. 129]. The
approved definition is given first and is followed by
amplifying remarks.
1. Rationalization
Any action that increases the effectiveness
of Allied forces through more efficient or
effective use of defense resources committed
to the Alliance needs, standardization,
specialization, mutual support, improved
interoperability or greater cooperation.
Rationalization applies to both weapons/
materiel resources and nonweapons military
matters [Ref. 6]
.
This is a general definition which provides a basis for all
policies relating to standardization. In effect, it says
that anything the NATO members do to enhance military
effectiveness and/or the economic condition of the collective
countries is a desirable goal. Rationalization may, in
fact, result in some nations giving up some degree of






The process by which member nations achieve
the closest practicable cooperation among forces;
the most efficient use of research, development,
and production resources; and agree to adopt on
the broadest possible basis the use of (a) common
or compatible operational, administrative, and
logistics procedures; (b) common or compatible
technical procedures and criteria; (c) common,
compatible, or interchangeable supplies, com-
ponents, weapons, or equipment; and (d) common
or compatible tactical doctrine with correspond-
ing organizational compatibility [Ref
. 6]
.
This definition also is very general in that it does
not specify the degree to which systems will be made "alike."
It merely states that movement towards some degree of "alike-
ness" is desirable. This definition forms one of the principal
bases for development of a hierarchy of standardization which




The ability of systems, units, or forces to
provide services to and accept services from other
systems, units or forces and to use the services
so exchanged to enable them to operate effective-
ly together [Ref. 6].
The definition of interoperability implies that the
overall military effectiveness of multinational forces will
be enhanced. Standardization and interoperability are the
The term "systems" must be interpreted in the broadest
sense. A system can be a physical entity such as a ship,
aircraft or set of electronic equipment. It can also be a
set of administrative procedures -or tactical doctrines. Most
important, a system can be (and usually is) a mix of all of
the above. For purposes of brevity the expression "system"
will be considered to encompass all of the above.
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expressions most frequently used to define the implementation
methods used to achieve highest rationalization. It is
important to understand the distinction between them as
seen by DoD and NATO members. Standardization focuses on
efforts to make future systems common (as much as possible)
.
Interoperability attempts to make all systems work well
together, regardless of whether they are common or not
[Ref. 3, p. 5]. A TACAIR example is the Identification
Friend or Foe equipment (IFF). If two or more NATO nations'
aircraft have different designs of IFF equipment they will
probably not be interchangeable or common. However, if
they can still function together in an operating environment
to mutually identify each other, they are considered to be
interoperable.
4. Compatibility *
Capability of two or more items or components
of equipment or materiel to exist or function
in the same system or environment without mutual
interference [Ref. 5, p. 128].
This definition does not imply any degree of functional
relationship. All it says is that one system will not cause




A Condition which exists when two or more
items possess such functional and physical
characteristics as to be equivalent in perfor-
mance and durability, and are capable of being
exchanged one for the other without alteration
of the items themselves or of adjoining items,
except for adjustment, and without selection
for fit and performance [Ref. 5, p. 128].
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This definition implies that the items do not have to
be identical as to their internal design. However, the items
must be equivalent one to another. This implies that form,
fit, and function must be similar enough to the rest of the
system as to cause no significant change in performance.
Adaptors and other forms of compensation may be required.
Once again in the TACAIR case, rearmament of one nation's
aircraft with weapons or stores from another nation's air-
base is a good example. U.S. aircraft, for instance, will
normally carry U.S. weapons. However, if the circumstances
warrant doing so and the weapons are designed to be inter-
changeable, that same aircraft may also carry United Kingdom
weapons, Italian weapons, and so on.
6. Commonality
A quality which applies to materiel or systems
possessing like and interchangeable characteristics
enabling each to be utilized or operated and
maintained by personnel trained on the others
without additional specialized training; and/or
having interchangeable repair parts and/or com-
ponents; and applying to consumable items inter-
changeably equivalent without adjustment [Ref. 6].
Commonality suggests that there are no significant
external differences between items. That is, the "form,
fit, and function" are identical. The internal composition,
however, may be different. Thus, the systems need not be
identical. They just need to function in all respects as
if they are. A TACAIR case is 20 mm ammunition. External
form, fit, and function is identical from one country to
20

another (in most cases) . The internal design may or may
not be identical but gun operation will still be possible.
C. HIERARCHY OF STANDARDIZATION
It is apparent that there are a significant number of
terms related to standardization and interoperability within
NATO. Although all terms have been officially accepted and
agreed to by DoD, NATO, or both, there has not been an
adequate attempt to depict the relationships among them.
Nor has there been an organized attempt to use the defini-
tions or an organized standardization program as an aid in
planning the acquisition of systems and materials within
NATO or in unifying NATO-wide procedures and doctrines.
There is a tendency to consider standardization as a dis-
crete concept, i.e., "We either have it or we don't."
The real life situation is that standardization exists at
a number of definable levels.
Figure 2 illustrates the relationships among the
previously defined standardization terms and shows how these
represent increasingly greater degrees of standardization.
The hierarchy of standardization is presented for two
purposes. The first purpose is to provide the reader with a
way of understanding the meaning of standardization within
the NATO context. The second purpose is to develop a tool
which can be used to aid in making decisions with regard to

























































Standardization, as used here and throughout the remainder
of this thesis, should be considered as encompassing the
entire spectrum from total dissimilarity to identicality
.
The degree of standardization is greatest at the center of
the figure and each level becomes a subset of the one
preceding it.
TACAIR will be used again as an example to illustrate
the hierarchy of standardization. Specifically, aircraft
launched precision guided munitions (PGM) will be assumed
using laser seekers. Designation of targets will be by
either airborne or ground-based lasers.
Compatible systems reflect a degree of standardization
wherein there is no mutual or unilateral degradation in
performance or function among them. This lowest degree
merely indicates peaceful coexistence in the same environment
but no mutual support. According to the definition of com-
patibility, the PGM's and target designators of different
nations cannot help each other but at least they do not
interfere. There is essentially no interoperability in
this degree.
Interoperability takes a step forward towards standardiza-
tion. At this level, two or more systems are not only
compatible but are able to function together in a cooperative
sense. They mutually aid and support each other to the bene-
fit of both. In this sense interoperability becomes a subset
of compatibility. Several case examples come to mind. A
23

U.S. PGM might be used with a target designator from another
country. They mutually support one another. Another example,
currently being implemented, is cross- servicing of aircraft
Aircraft from one nation may land, refuel, and rearm at the
airbase of another nation.
The next degree of increased standardization is inter-
changeability. This represents a considerable advance in that
the systems are not only interoperable but can be exchanged
one for another should the need arise. The condition is
that the exchange should be able to be accomplished with only
minor adjustments and realignments. At this level, the
NATO members may go their own ways in design and production
of equipment and materials, but it is important to maintain
such close coordination of functions, performance, and
interfaces that the system or equipments may still be substi-
tuted one for another. The internal design and composition,
however, may still be entirely different. Continuing with
the tactical aircraft example, a U.S. aircraft would rearm
at an FRG airfield using PGM weapons of FRG design instead
of U.S. weapons. This might involve the use of special
adaptors, rigging and different procedures but would result
in a fully combat ready aircraft.
Commonality is the next higher degree of standardization
and reflects a relatively small but potentially important
advance over interchangeability . Commonality allows complete
interchange of systems with no need for adjustments,
24

realignments or any other form of compensation in other system
components. To all extents and purposes the form, fit and
function are exactly the same even though the internal design
and composition may still be different. Obviously control of
interfaces becomes critical at this level. Once again using
the tactical aircraft example, the FRG weapon would be to
all intents and purposes the same as an equivalent U.S.
weapon. This "alikeness" would extend beyond physical
characteristics such as length, weight and form to include
handling/safety procedures, maintenance procedures, etc. The
only external differences allowable would be in minor areas
such as color and markings which do not affect form, fit, and
function. The difference between this degree of standardiza-
tion and interchangeability is in the elimination of adaptors
or other forms of external compensation.
One additional comment should be made regarding the
hierarchy of standardization. It may be difficult to fit a
particular system into just one of the degrees of standardi-
zation described. In fact, it is likely that decomposition
into system components, procedures, tasks, or doctrines and
policies may reveal that each exists at a different place
in the hierarchy from the others.
D. THE SYSTEMS APPROACH
The systems approach is a generalized framework by which
decision making may take place in a logical and coherent
25

manner. Churchman provides a succinct definition,
"Systems are made up of sets of components that work
together for the overall objective of the whole. The
systems approach is simply a way of thinking about
these systems and their components [Ref. 7, p. 11]."
It is the intent here to firmly establish a systems approach
framework by which NATO standardization decisions may be
made
.
A reasonable first step is to define the term "system."
According to Kline
:
"A system is a set of elements organized to perform
a set of designated functions in order to achieve
desired results. An element is a set of resources
organized to perform some highly interrelated sub-
set of the desired system functions. The resources
which comprise a system include personnel, materiel,
equipment, facilities, and information [Ref. 8,
p. 1-14]."
The above definition is generally applicable in that it
includes doctrines, principles, and procedures as well as
physical hardware. It is in this broad view that the word
"system" must be defined. Standardization in the NATO
context must include not only physical equipment and
materials but administrative procedures, logistics philoso-
phies, tactical doctrines, and even broad economic and
political relationships between the nations. The importance
of thinking of systems on a total view cannot be over-
emphasized. It is with this kind of view that decision-
making with regard to standardization must begin. This
idea is discussed more fully in the next section.
26

The systems approach is simply a way of planning, analyzing,
and making rational, informed decisions with regard to systems.
According to Ramo
:
"The systems approach applies logic, wisdom, and
imagination on a sophisticated technological level.
It is often quantitative and always objective. It
makes possible the consideration of vast amounts of
data and of numerous, often conflicting, considera-
tions. It spells out the interactions among the
elements of complex real-life problems, recognizing
the need for careful compromises, for 'tradeoffs'
among competing factors such as time versus cost.
It uses simulation and mathematical modeling, when
applicable, to predict performance before the entire
system is brought into being. By insisting on an
examination of the total problem -- the goals, the
criteria, the costs, the benefits, and the penalties --
it seeks to disclose what we can expect to get and
what it will cost us, and it makes feasible the
selection of the best from among many alternatives."
Ramo goes on to say,
"It (the systems engineering approach) concentrates
on the analysis and design of the whole
,
as distinct
from the components or the parts. It insists upon
looking at a problem in its entirety
,
taking into
account all the facets and all the variables, and
relating the social to the technological aspects
[Ref. 9, p. 15] ."
Kline provides an excellent foundation for applying the
systems approach to decision-making for NATO standardization:
"The systems approach recognizes the inter-
relationships which tie a system together; it
recognizes that factoring out a part of a problem
by neglecting the interactions among subsystems
and components increases significantly the proba-
bility that a solution to the problem will not be
found; it requires that the boundaries of the system
be extended outward as far as is required to deter-
mine which interrelationships are significant to
the solution of the problem [Ref. 18, p. 1-12]."
27

Thus it is apparent that any attempt to standardize systems,
procedures or doctrines on a piecemeal basis without con-
sideration for overall impact may not succeed in achieving
desired standardization results.
A general overview of the systems approach is not complete
without some discussion concerning the system life cycle. As
seen in Figure 3, Kline [Ref. 8, p. 2-3] breaks the system
life cycle into separate and distinct phases. These phases
match quite well with the DoD acquisition cycle as well
as the actual events which occur throughout a system's life.
The four factors at the top of the figure represent the
primary inputs to problem formulation discussed in the next
section. While the issue of standardization may come up
at any phase of the system life cycle, the planning period
decisions are of most critical importance. It is this
period, consisting of the concept formulation and system
definition phases, for which the approach and recommendations
of this thesis are focused.
E. APPLICATION OF THE SYSTEMS APPROACH TO STANDARDIZATION
An important objective of this thesis is to present an
analytic methodology based on systems approach principles.
This methodology should result in more effective and
rational standardization decisions. Figure 4 is a slight
modification of the system design process definition by
Kline [Ref. 8, p. 3-2]. This figure illustrates the
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NATO standardization and will be referred to throughout the
following discussion.
1 . System Design Model
The model for system design, shown in Figure 4,
illustrates a basic decision model.
It begins with formulation of the problem to be
solved in terms of requirements and objectives to be reached.
It then proceeds with the synthesis of possible (and
reasonable) solutions to the problem. These system alter-
natives are analyzed to obtain data on system characteristics
and performance. A comparative evaluation is made, i.e.,
how does each system solution compare to the original
objectives and criteria established during formulation?
When a satisfactory and reasonably optimum solution has been
reached, a decision should be made to implement that solu-
tion. If evaluation indicates that none of the system
alternatives meets the criteria then the alternatives must be
revised, the requirements and objectives redefined or both.
This last step represents the iterative nature of the process.
Thus, the system design process provides a means whereby the
problem and its possible solutions may be matched in an optimal
way. Each step of the process is now discussed in more detail





Many different factors influence a decision on
whether or not a system should be standardized throughout
NATO. These factors provide the input information which is
used to establish standardization requirements and objectives
during the formulation process. Consideration should be
given to such factors as
:
.Basic military requirement
.Degree of current system obsolescence
.Degree of current system standardization
.Extent of NATO-wide usage
.Impact of new technology
.Environmental and doctrinal constraints
.Increase in threat resulting from standardization
These factors are representative of the kinds of information
needed to formulate requirements and objectives. Some of
the information will be subjective, at least initially.
Other information will be more specific and objective.
A potential problem which has occurred many times
within NATO is the existence of conflicts in the input infor-
mation. These conflicts may have military or political over-
tones (such as giving up a technological capability in order
to achieve standardization) or just basic disagreement as to
the need for standardization for a particular system. What-
ever the cause, it is apparent that such conflicts between
nations have always existed and will continue to exist in
32

the future. The important thing is to make sure that the
process continues and is not stymied by early disagreements.
b. Problem Formulation
Problem formulation consists of combining all the
input information in such a way as to arrive at requirements
and objectives for standardization. The importance of doing
a good job in this step cannot be emphasized too strongly.
This is the point in the system design process which sets
the direction for all subsequent efforts. Hall [Ref. 10,
p. 105J makes the statement,
"It is much more important to choose the 'right'
objectives than the 'right' system. To choose the
wrong objective is to solve the wrong problem; to
choose the wrong system is merely to choose an
unoptimized system,"
It is at this point that the desired degree of standardiza-
tion should be determined. It should be recognized that
this objective is established initially with concern only
for the degree of desired standardization. Later steps
will determine whether or not the selected degree of
standardization is feasible.
Requirements and objectives should be stated in
specific terms. They should be precise and unambiguous so
that they can be used to measure effectiveness of later de-
cisions. Requirements and objectives should be consistent and
mutually supporting. If inconsistencies or conflicts exist,
that should be a strong indicator that further tradeoffs and
compromise are needed before proceeding to the next phase.
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In the case of TACAIR, a decision might be made
to have interoperability of aircraft, certain weapons/stores,
communications/nav aids, and airbase support as a minimum
degree of standardization. The degree to which these
equipments and systems can be standardized and made inter-
operable is determined during the following phases of the
system design process. Constraints may be placed on the
requirements and objectives. For example, several nations
may be unwilling to accept common weapons/stores. They
may be more interested in producing their own weapons/stores
because of possible sales to non-NATO nations. Other nations
may have difficulty reconciling differences in tactical
doctrines and this can have a strong effect on interoperability,
These constraints are important and must be considered,
c. Synthesis of System Structures
The next phase in the system design process is
synthesis of system structures, i.e., develop a system (or
alternative systems) which may be capable of satisfying the
desired standardization requirements and objectives. This
phase should be undertaken without an assessment at this
time as to whether standardization of the system between
NATO members is feasible. Indeed, it may be detrimental
to achieving an optimum system if some of the possible
structures are discarded at this point before analysis and
evaluation. Structuring of alternative systems may take
several forms depending on the nature of the standardization
34

requirement. If different NATO systems already exist, the
process may be one of describing them separately with the
intent of identifying those areas where various levels of
standardization apply. Also implicit in this is identifica-
tion of those system elements in which modifications may
allow standardization to be achieved. If a new requirement
is determined for which no system is in existence, then
alternative structures may be developed to suit that require-
ment.
It is necessary to understand the meaning of the
expression "system structure" before proceeding further.
Chestnut [Ref. 11, p. 98] gives a definition.
"Structure is the form, the arrangement of
parts, the interrelationship of parts as dominated
by the general character of the whole."
Chestnut expands this definition in more detail,
"....structuring is a way of subdividing or partitioning
a large problem into a number of smaller problems
which presumably can be handled separately and there-
fore more easily. Thus, structuring provides a method
for reducing the apparent dimensionality of large system
problems by decoupling the interaction between the
different parts through the mechanism of organized
separation. Although this subdivision or structuring
is performed to provide a first approximation to the
solution of the whole problem, the interaction of the
parts must be considered later once an apparently
satisfactory first-order solution has been developed.
The structuring assists in the more rapid realization
of the first-order solution to the overall problem."
What Chestnut is saying is that structuring is a way of
thinking about and understanding systems by breaking them
down into smaller, more manageable elements.
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An example of system structuring is shown in
Figures 5 and 6 and typifies the approach described by
Chestnut. In this case, existing tactical air forces are
considered to be the system, with one such force in exis-
tence in each NATO nation as indicated. In Figure 5, it
is shown that each NATO member concerned has essentially the
same type of system. Each nation's TACAIR may be broken down
into aircraft, weapons/stores and operational support. These
three items may be broken down again into progresssively
greater detail as displayed in Figure 6 for the aircraft
element. This decomposition process will continue as long
as required to reduce to the lowest meaningful system level.
It is apparent that the system could be decomposed into
several different types of structure depending on the nature
of the standardization decision to be made. The first level
might very well be structured according to function rather
than NATO member TACAIR. The first level would then contain
elements such as fighter/intercept, strike, and patrol air-
craft with the different nations split off as smaller elements
under the major headings.
Close examination of the characteristics of each
NATO member's TACAIR will reveal that they do not always have
Not all NATO nations have a significant tactical air
capability; Luxemborg and Iceland are examples. Only those
nations which contribute to the total NATO tactical air capa-
bility need be involved in standardization decisions. Deter-




































































the same system structures and element classifications. One
nation may have only simple weapons without target sensors
and signal processing whereas another nation may have very
sophisticated weapons. Emphasis on certain areas may be
different also. In one nation, the aircraft avionics may be
very complex and capable of performing many functions.
Another nation may have tactical aircraft with very simple
navigation, communication, and fire control equipment.
Nevertheless, the basic elements of TACAIR should be the same
in all cases. The main point is that the systems, whether
existing or to be developed to meet new needs, must be broken
down into a common structural framework prior to analysis
of standardization possibilities. This is the essence of
system structuring.
The interaction and interrelationships between
elements of a structure form the system interfaces. These
interfaces are best established after the structure has been
initially completed. First, each element of the structure,
at any particular level, is compared with all other elements
at the same level to determine if any interaction is present.
An interface point is defined as existing between these
elements if the analysis shows one or more relationships. The
ease with which system elements work together or mesh with
other systems is determined by the interfaces. Interfaces may
take many forms. They may range from meshing tactical pro-
cedures in a coordinated multinational air strike down to
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making refuel nozzles identical on all aicraft. It depends
entirely on the level of the system structure.
An understanding of the system interfaces is
critical in making standardization decisions. Because of
its importance the topic of interfaces and their impact on
standardization is discussed separately in section F in
this chapter. For now it is sufficient to understand that
they exist and must be fully accounted for.
d. Analysis of System Structures
In the analysis step of the system design process,
the impact of the system structure and the hierarchy of
standardization are determined. The purpose is to establish
a specific degree of standardization for each element at
each level of the system structure. The requirements and
objectives which were set during problem formulation are
used throughout this analysis as evaluation criteria for
setting the degrees of standardization.
Figures 5 and 6 will be used as an example
system structure to illustrate the procedure. The first
breakdown of TACAIR into elements yields forces for each
of the NATO members. The rapid expansion of system
elements precludes showing the structure for each nation.
Suffice it to assume they are pretty much the same.
Figure 7 demonstrates the analysis process in
simplified flow chart format. The first step is to deter-













are or should be compatible according to the minimum degree of
standardization shown in the hierarchy of standardization.
If the answer is negative it must be determined whether the
analysis should proceed to the next element. In some cases
it may be necessary to re-evaluate the requirements and
objectives very early in the analysis.
The process continues by comparing the increasing
degrees of standardization, as shown in the hierarchy of
standardization, with the system element under analysis. The
next question is, "Should TACAIR be interoperable?" If
the decision is yes then the question is asked again with
regard to interchangeability . This process extends on until
the question receives a negative answer. The last degree
of standardization which received a positive answer is
then selected, tentatively for TACAIR.
The next step is to move to the next lower
level of the system structure and repeat the above process
for each element at that level. This analysis is repeated
again until a decision is reached as to the highest degree
of standardization for aircraft. Table I presents an
example of the implementation of various degrees of
standardization for an aircraft element. The next element
is weapons/stores and it is examined in the same way. The
process is continued at this structure level until completed





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































The result of this analysis is a well defined
system structure with a reasonably thorough understanding
of the degree to which it may be standardized throughout
NATO.
A decision to have a given degree of standardiza^
tion at one level of a system does not mean that all lower
levels will have to have the same degree or greater. For
example, a decision might be made throughout NATO to have
interchangeable avionics system elements on tactical air-
craft. This decision, however, applies only to the entire
avionics element taken as a whole. It does not necessarily
follow that lower level elements, such as communications
equipment, can be interchanged from one nation's aircraft
to another. The ability to be interchangeable at the next
lower level must be based on a deliberate decision made
concerning that level.
The flow chart format makes it all look easy.
In reality, each decision point may require long, difficult
trade-off studies and compromises. The process described
above simply sets the entire effort into a logical,
It is reasonable to consider standardization of less
than the complete element. In the case of avionics it might
be decided to standardize on navigation and communication
equipment, for example, and leave radar and fire control
equipment up to the individual nations. The approach taken




step-by-step framework. It provides a means for making
decisions in a systematic, optimal way rather than in
random fashion. Even so careful reasoning must still be an
integral part of this process.
e. Evaluation, Decision and Optimization
The final three steps are reasonably straight-
forward. Evaluation consists of comparing the standardiza-
tion analysis with the requirements and objectives criteria
as shown in Figure 4. If the standardization decisions
match the original requirements and objectives (assuming
they have not changed) , then a decision to implement the
defined degrees of standardization can be made. If there
is a mismatch, it is necessary to iterate the process via
the optimization loop shown in Figure 4. This involves
revising the system structures, or redefining requirements
and objectives, or both. Of course, it will be necessary
to go through the analysis phase again but it should be
considerably easier since the basic system structure and
general fit of the degrees of standardization are usually
much better understood after the first pass through. This
is probably true even though optimization may have caused
some changes in the structure or requirements and objectives.
The iterative process will continue as necessary until an
acceptable level of agreement between the standardization
solution and the requirements and objectives has been reached
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In the case of TACAIR, assume a requirement is to
have interchangeability between aircraft and weapons/stores
of the NATO nations. If, after the analysis and evaluation
steps, it is determined that interchangeability is feasible
and agreeable between the nations, then the system design
process is complete and implementation may take place. If,
on the other hand, agreement or technical feasibility is not
achieved then both the requirements and system structures
must be reviewed. In the case of requirements it would be
wise to ask if the standardization requirements were set too
stringent and whether interoperability might be a better goal
Also, one or more nations may have technical difficulty
adapting their aircraft to accept the entire list of weapons/
stores. In this case the list should be reassessed. On
the system structure side, the same technical difficulties
might be resolved by careful analysis and evaluation of
problem areas.
The system design model has been presented as a
practical aid in determining degrees of standardization of
systems between NATO nations. In actual use some of the
steps may be accomplished quickly and easily. For example,
the problem formulation phase could define requirements and
objectives well enough to cause the structuring and analysis
phases to converge quite rapidly on a solution. This does
not mean that any steps should be left out but rather that
optimization can be accomplished rather easily if problem




The impact of interfaces between systems and system
elements is of critical concern. Success or failure of
efforts to achieve standardization of systems and/or their
elements depends on careful consideration and understanding
of interfaces. It is the intent of this section to present
a definition of system interfaces along with some of their
characteristics as related to standardization.
1 • Definitions
Webster [Ref. 12] defines interface in two ways.
"A surface regarded as the common boundary
of two bodies of space."
"The facts, problems, considerations,
theories, practices, etc. shared by two or
more disciplines, procedures, or fields of
study."
Although technically correct, these definitions are general
and do not reflect the exact meaning and impact of system
interfaces to system standardization. An alternate defini-
tion is offered for consideration. This definition more
accurately reflects the strong system-oriented nature of
interfaces
.
Interfaces are those interrelationships which
exist between systems and between various identi-
fiable elements of a system and which, when proper-
ly matched, allow the system to function at maximum
efficiency and effectiveness.
Maximum efficiency and effectiveness as used in the above
definition does not mean the system is of optimal design to
meet established requirements. It simply means that the
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interfaces have been matched so as to permit the systems to
perform together as well as possible for any given design.
All the interfaces should be considered to under-
stand the complete functioning of the system, both internally
as well as relative to other systems. The properties of






Some of the interfaces are obvious , such as the mating of
connectors between a weapon and an aircraft. Others are
not as obvious. For example, the interaction between a
missile radar guidance unit and a shipboard electromagnetic
radiation pattern is an environmental interface which is
less well defined. It might even be ignored until a
problem develops.
2 . Interface Characteristics
The maximum number of interfaces among elements of
a system (or when comparing elements among several systems)
can become very large. It is partially dependent on a
number of elements and levels which are defined during system
structuring. The larger the number of elements, the larger
the number of potential interfaces. Figure 8 is a simplified
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different but similarly constructed NATO TACAIR systems, one
from the U.S. and one from F.R.G. The issue is to determine
if a degree of standardization can be established to allow
U.S. and F.R.G. aircraft and weapons/stores to be interoperable
Figure 8 shows the case of U.S. aircraft and F.R.G. weapons/
stores. An identical diagram (not shown) needs to be drawn
showing U.S. weapons/stores and F.R.G. aircraft. The dotted
lines show potential interfaces between aircraft and weapons/
stores. A more detailed analysis, however, shows only two
interfaces which have any meaning or impact on interopera-
bility. These interfaces are:
.Aircraft airframe to weapons/stores airframe
mechanical interface associated with suspension
equipment, pylons, and release- j ettison equipment.
.Aircraft avionics to weapons/stores guidance
and control electrical interfaces associated
with transfer of target data, command/control
signals, status information, and pre-launch
power.
It is important when analyzing and comparing different
systems to try to bring their structures into a common frame-
work. This is because different framework structures may
have different interfaces between elements. Comparing inter-
faces between dissimilar structure frameworks is like com-
paring apples and oranges. They are not the same thing.
The results, if obtainable, will not necessarily reflect the
actual case.
There is a need to have well defined interfaces.
Lack of knowledge about interfaces between elements leaves
50

room for uncertainty as to whether the degrees of standardi-
zation selected are achievable. Interfaces must be well
defined and understood, whether they are part of existing
systems or created as part of a new system structure. Assume,
for example, a weapon/store produced by one nation is to be
made interoperable with an aircraft produced by another
nation. If pre-launch electrical power from the aircraft
to the weapon is defined simply in terms of primary voltage
and current requirements and secondary parameters such as
ripple voltage, regulation, and transient recovery are
neglected, then the interface is not well defined. The
weapon may not be able to function properly if the secondary
parameters are outside of acceptable limits. This is a
simple example but, nevertheless, represents the level of
detail which is needed to have a well defined interface.
Identification of the interfaces occurs during the
system synthesis phase after structuring has been completed.
It is important to note that not all elements will have
interfaces with all other elements. Although the number of
actual interfaces in a real system will be less than the
theoretical maximum, it is still important to examine each
potential one to see if it is significant.
It is very important to establish interface standards




(1) Agreement on significant interfaces at all
levels of a system will allow early achievement of the lower
degrees of standardization. Systems will then be at least
compatible or interoperable. This will facilitate an
early NATO-wide solution of the problems of decreasing
military effectiveness.
(2) If the NATO nations decide on acquisition of
common systems the interfaces between the new common systems
and existing systems will already have been standardized.
A significant part of the system engineering task will be
reduced.
(3) If the NATO nations are not unanimous in selection
of a common or interchangeable system then those who go their
own way will at least be interoperable.
Identification and analysis of the important inter-
faces is basic to the entire process of standardization.
If improperly done the end result may actually degrade
overall system performance. In the NATO context it is
vitally important that all nations be aware of the need
for careful definition and understanding of interfaces
between systems and their respective elements.
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III. THE NATO ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION
A. INTRODUCTION
It is the intent of this chapter to present a detailed
description of the primary organizations and activities
currently tasked to achieve within NATO. The overall NATO
organization is presented first followed by descriptions of
the Military Agency for Standardization (MAS) and the
Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) . The MAS
and the CNAD organizations represent the bodies within NATO
in which standardization efforts are being carried out.
B. THE NATO ORGANIZATION
It is important to have an overall understanding of the
NATO organizational structure before attempting to analyze
the activities of those groups most responsible for the
implementation of standardization.
NATO Facts and Figures, an official publication of the
NATO Information Service, provides the following description
"The North Atlantic Council, the highest
authority in NATO, provides a forum for wide
political consultation and co-ordination between
the allies. Military policy is discussed in the
Defense Planning Committee (DPC) composed of member
countries participating in NATO's integrated defense
system.... The Secretary General of NATO is chairman
of the Council and the DPC and also heads the
International Staff. In support of their roles,
the Council and the DPC have established a number
of Committees, the most important of which are
shown in [Figure 9]. These Committees cover the
whole range of NATO's activities and meet under the
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The Military Committee, composed of the Chiefs-of-
Staff of the member countries taking part in the
NATO integrated military structure, is the senior
military authority in the Alliance. It provides
advice to the Council/DPC on military matters and
gives guidance to the major NATO Commanders....
Implementation of the policies and decisions of the
Military Committee is ensured by the International
Military Staff (IMS) acting as executive agency.
The NATO defense area is divided into three
separate regional Commands -- the Atlantic Ocean
Command, the European Command and the Channel
Command -- and a Regional Planning Group for
the North American area. Under the general
guidance of the Military Committee the major NATO
Commanders are responsible for planning the defense
of their areas and for conducting NATO's land, sea
and air exercises." [Ref. 13, p. 204]
The NATO organization consists of a civilian side and a
military side with the military side reporting to top-level
civilian policy groups (the North Atlantic Council and
Defense Planning Committee) . This overall civilian/military
split has been extended to include a split in standardiza-
tion efforts and approaches as well. The military side
attempts to achieve standardization goals through the
Military Agency for Standardization (MAS) . The civil side
has the same overall goal and conducts its activities through
the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) . The
methods of achieving standardization, however, are different
and this is explained in sections III.C and III.D.
C. THE MILITARY AGENCY FOR STANDARDIZATION (MAS)
The MAS was formed in 1951 under the direction of the
Military Committee as the principal agency concerned with
standardization. The Military Committee provided policy-level
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direction to the MAS. This policy document states:
"NATO military standardization is the process by
which member nations achieve the closest practi-
cable cooperation among forces, the most efficient
use of research, development and production resources,
and agree to adopt on the broadest possible basis
the use of:
(a) Common or compatible operational, administrative
and logistics procedures.
(t>) Common or compatible technical procedures and
criteria.
(c) Common, compatible or interchangeable supplies,
components, weapons or equipment.
(d) Common or compatible tactical doctrine with
corresponding organizational capability." [Ref. 14]
The Military Committee realized very early that trying to
get all NATO members to agree to standardization of all
equipments, systems, procedures, tactics, etc., would be a
task with little payoff for the effort expended. The
Military Committee therefore adopted a basic policy in which
it was recognized that each NATO member would be responsible
for equipping its own forces. It was further recognized
that the various nations were likely to have widely varying
military requirements which would further complicate attempts
to standardize. An example of this is the difference between
U.S. forces, which are only partly committed to a European-
type conflict, as opposed to a nation such as the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG) which is fully committed to
Western Europe defense. The U.S. must procure weapons/
equipment and develop tactics and logistics procedures to
engage in any type of conflict in any part of the world.
The FRG, on the other hand, need concentrate solely on
defending against front-line assault by Warsaw Pact forces.
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The U.S. would obviously prefer to develop its forces to
handle all situations and not be forced to provide extensive
"theatre-specialized" forces and equipment. The FRG , under-
standably, does not want to pay for capabilities which are
beyond its needs and means. Extend this situation to the
thirteen armed NATO members and it is readily seen that
disagreement over specific requirements is likely to always
exist.
As a result of this state of affairs the Military
Committee realized that since standardization would be
difficult to achieve amongst all the NATO nations, it must
be accomplished on a voluntary basis. This policy was
given a small degree of influence by emphasizing the
essential need for standardization where effective imple-
mentation of operational plans depends on it.
This has tended to become submerged in the daily
affairs of the MAS. Additional instructions to the MAS
include the need to give priority to (not in order of
importance)
:
1. Standardization of components
2. Standardization of stores in large consumption
3. Interchangeability of ammunition
4. The development of adaptors
5. Joint development of future equipment
The practical result of this is that the MAS has tended
to achieve NATO-wide standardization on a number of smaller
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issues in which agreement is possible but has had little
impact on the requirements of the forces and major systems
acquisitions
.
The MAS organization is shown in Figure 10. The basic
MAS Committee consists of the MAS Chairman and three Service
Board Chairmen. These chairmen, as well as the secretariat
staff, are all "international"; that is, they serve the
interests of the MAS organization rather than their respec-
tive nations. Each Service Board is organized along tradi-
tional Army, Navy, and Air Force lines. A standardization
task is assigned to one of the Service Boards by the MAS
Chairman with Military Committee agreement. Assignment is
usually based on which service function is likely to be
most impacted by the particular standardization issue. The
actual effort is carried on by separate Working Panels.
These lower-tier groups are composed of military and
civilian experts in the particular area which the Working
Panel had been tasked to address. These are the people who
actually accomplish the studies, analyses, tests, and
preparation of draft standards. The Working Panel members are
"national" in character; that is, they represent the opinions
and positions of their respective nations. Many of the
Working Panels are ad hoc in nature in that they are formed
and disbanded as the need arises. The organization, as
shown in Figure 10, will quite likely be different at the
























CO QH m2 cj
W o2 erf3 Oh CO
cd H
E- >* Oh





H CO Q <V
— 2 ^
3 < Si<U CJ CO
ai HH Oh erf
hH hJ <* h-
1








































H hJ <X t—
<
< -r*& crf > a
§ s < s
























However, the nature of the panels should still be evident
from their titles as shown in Figure 10.
In general, standardization efforts in the Navy and Army-
Boards and Panels have been more concerned with standardiza-
tion of procedures and tactics. The Air panels have extended
their efforts to include a selected set of equipment, systems
and components. There is no organization within the MAS to
ensure that the Working Panels coordinate their efforts with
one another except for fairly broad administrative direction
given by the Service Board Chairman. Unlike the CNAD, the
MAS has no direct, visible link to the authority vested in
the various national defense ministers. The MAS is a
relatively low-level organization with several layers of
management before reaching the North Atlantic Council. Thus,
the MAS lacks power.
The function of the MAS is to promulgate standardization
proposals in conformity with Military Committee policy. In
general these proposals should be processed through the MAS
organization if they have NATO-wide application although this
policy has been relaxed considerably over the past several
years. Proposals for standardization may be initiated by
the North Atlantic Council, the Defense Planning Committee,
Military Committee, various national staffs, operational
commanders or from within MAS itself.
The end products of the MAS are NATO Standardization
Agreements (STANAGS) or Allied Publications (AP) . A STANAG
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is a record of agreement among several or all of the member
nations to accept a standardization proposal for like or
similar military equipment, ammunition, supplies and stores,
and operational, logistic and administrative procedures.
It is negotiated with nations, discussed with NATO commands,
ratified by some or all nations, promulgated by MAS, and
issued to the various Ministries of Defense and NATO
commands. An AP may be an informative document not
requiring ratification by NATO members or it may require
approval action by the nations involved. The latter is •
ratified through the processes in which the NATO members
agree to accept and use the manual.
The procedure whereby the MAS promulgates a STANAG
begins with the receipt of a standardization proposal from
one of the sources previously mentioned. The responsible
Service Board assigns the proposal to a working panel (or
creates a new one) for direct action. The Working Panel
then studies the proposal itself or reassigns it to a
custodian. A custodian may be any particular group or
individual representing a particular national interest. The
proposal is then studied and a draft STANAG is prepared. The
draft STANAG is reviewed by all interested NATO members,
comments are received and incorporated, and a final STANAG
is issued. The final STANAG is then sent on to the nations
for formal ratification. Acceptance occurs and is implemented
by incorporating the contents of the STANAG into the various
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military specifications and tactical doctrines of the
respective nations. Once a STANAG has been accepted and
incorporated into the NATO structure (in whatever fashion is
appropriate) , it is the responsibility of the NATO commands
to provide feedback to the MAS. This feedback should provide
specific information as to the effectiveness of the STANAGS
as disclosed by direct experience in training, operations,
exercises or any other source. It is intended to lead to
proposals for new STANAGS and improvements in existing ones.
D. THE CONFERENCE OF NATIONAL ARMAMENTS DIRECTORS (CNAD)
The CNAD, shown in Figure 11, was chartered in 1966 and
was an outgrowth of the older Armaments Committee (AC)
.
During the 1950' s and early 1960's the Armaments Committee
attempted to standardize by first gaining agreement on
common or standard military requirements. This approach was
based on a policy of rigid, inflexible adherence to single
NATO-wide policies without recognizing the inherent differ-
ences in character and needs of the various national forces.
The predictable result was that the NATO members never did
agree fully on basic military requirements. Even in areas
where partial agreement was reached, it tended to be ignored
at the national levels. The CNAD recognized the diversity
of requirements coupled with the fact that weapons development
and procurement, at least in Europe, is more of a political/
economic issue and less of a military matter [Ref. 15, p. 12].
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CNAD was considered the logical place to work out these
broader issues. Thus the burden of system and major equipment
level standardization shifted from the MAS to the CNAD.
The CNAD is kept up to date on military requirements by
having a Military Committee representative and advisor
included in all Armament Groups and Subgroups.
The new approach is to use the CNAD as a formal medium of
voluntary exchange of research, development, and procurement
information. Coupled with this is the CNAD task of identi-
fying priority tasks and requirements through ties to the
Military Committee. From this information, priorities
relative to standardization needs are determined. These
matters are summarized in the four basic principles by
which CNAD conducts business [Ref . 16]
:
(1) Each country is responsible for equipping its
own forces.
(2) NATO Military Authorities (NMA) should be able to
give opinions as to requirements of the NATO forces as
a whole
.
(3) Cooperation in R§D and production between two or
more members is to be encouraged and supported by NATO
but not mandated or directed.
(4) Countries are encouraged to present their respective
national military requirements and procurement plans.
The main standardization thrust by CNAD is to create a
forum of exchange between all NATO members. As a result of
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this exchange, if two or more nations can agree to harmonize
requirements and share the burden of weapons acquisition,
then they are encouraged to do so. While this approach does
not guarantee broad-scale standardization it is still
considered to be better than nothing. The emphasis in CNAD
is to address those equipments, systems, and material which
are currently in production or development. CNAD does not,
as a rule, establish broad-scale standards or specifications
on which future acquisitions are based. The latter falls
under the MAS area of responsibility.
The CNAD leadership is composed of senior government
officials responsible for acquisition of defense systems for
each of the NATO members. The current U.S. representative is
Dr. William Perry, Under Secretary of Defense for Research
and Engineering. In addition, the CNAD has a direct organi-
zational link to the North Atlantic Council whereas the MAS
must work through the Military Committee. These factors tend
to lend considerable weight to the CNAD.
Several groups and committees have been deleted from
Figure 11 in order to preserve clarity. The CNAD Council,
as indicated earlier, consists of the respective governmental
Ministries of Defense or their appointed representatives.
The National Armaments Directors Representatives (NADREPS)
are the senior members of national delegations and are
attached to the CNAD on a full-time basis. In addition to
carrying out the routine managerial tasks of CNAD, NADREPS
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also comprises the only formal tie to the MAS for exchange
of information.
The main bodies responsible for promoting cooperative
ventures are the three Armaments Groups. These groups,
like the MAS Service Boards, are organized along service
functional lines, i.e., Navy, Army and Air Force. The NATO
Industry Advisory Group (NIAG) provides information regarding
current technology and developments in the private sector.
It is imperative that the members of the Armament Groups be
able to speak with authority regarding national operational
concepts and material requirements. Each Armament Group
includes a number of Subgroups each of which deals with a
particular armament related topic. The Subgroups are analo-
gous to the MAS Working Panels in terms of function and
charter.
The method by which CNAD conducts business begins with a
proposal for cooperative action based on common requirements
and material needs. The proposal may be made by any repre-
sentative within the CNAD organization or by the NATO Military
Authorities. If two or more countries are interested in a
cooperative venture a subgroup will be formed to study the
proposal further. The nature of the proposals may range
from common procurement of a specific piece of equipment to
a much more general approach looking at such things as inter-
operability of multi-nation communication systems. If the
studies indicate that a cooperative approach is desirable and
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possible the Subgroup may petition the CNAD Committee to
designate the program as a "NATO Project." If accepted by
the CNAD the project then continues with details as to
licensing, coproduction, delivery schedules and priorities,
etc. , to be worked out between the participating NATO
members
.
In 1971 NATO attempted to strengthen the CNAD role even
further by directing the organization to work more closely
to define critical areas and needs for standardization.
Inputs as to operational field problems and requirements
were given more importance than before so that political,
economic and military were all placed at relatively equal
priority.
E. CURRENT NATO STANDARDIZATION ACTIVITIES
1. Periodic Armaments Planning System
Recent initiatives on the part of NATO have resulted
in further strengthening of the CNAD through formation of a
Periodic Armaments Planning System (PAPS). This is the title
given to the administrative procedure designed to aid the
CNAD in acquisition of NATO-wide systems and standardization
decisions. This new procedure operates entirely within the
policy framework of CNAD [Ref. 17].
Figure 12 illustrates the system life cycle as
defined for NATO projects. The ordering of NATO life cycle
phases has been adjusted to be compatible with the life cycle
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the U.S. decision milestones are superimposed on the NATO
phases to show the general relationship. Phase consists
of preliminary work in terms of long-range forecasting
(technology trends, political and economic affairs) and
mission analysis (operational threat, mission deficiencies).
The information gathered is combined with field experience
and replacement schedules for equipment to generate a
document equivalent to the U.S. Mission Element Needs
Statement (MENS)
.
This document supports phase 1 which is the Staff
Target Development. The First step in this phase is to
transform this MENS-like document into a detailed set of
functional requirements and objectives. At this point all
NATO nations participate and help formulate the requirements
Also, at this point, some nations may decide they are no
longer affected by, or interested in, the particular require'
ments and will play a lesser role, such as monitoring the
other nation's efforts. The set of functional requirements
includes mission needs (as stated in the document) , initial
cost estimates, schedules, and operational considerations in
such areas as support and training. These requirements and
objectives are contained in a document called the "Outline
Staff Target." This document, in turn, guides the second
part of phase 1 which consists of pre-feasibility studies,
alternate systems concept development, and evaluation. The
output of this phase consists of a selected system approach
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and sufficient planning data to allow continuation into
phase 2. Also at the conclusion of phase 1, those nations
wishing to continue cooperation prepare a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) to act as a statement of agreement among
nations. Those nations which elect not to participate will
continue monitoring the effort with possibility of involvement
at a later date. At this point in the life cycle, the project
begins to lose its NATO-wide character and begins to assume
the nature of a group of collaborating nations. Even though
the project may be designated a NATO project, NATO does not
fill a management role but, rather, performs a monitoring
function. The group of collaborating nations work out the
project organization and management roles among themselves.
The CNATJ has little direct involvement after phase 1.
The remainder of the NATO acquisition phases coincide
closely with U.S. practice and will not be discussed further.
2 . NATO Armanents Planning Review
A description of current activities would not be
complete without a brief mention of the NATO Armaments Plan-
ning Review (NAPR) . This administrative process, illustrated
in Figure 12, provides a heretofore missing link which gives
operational feedback information in the form of field experi-
ence, problems, opportunities, and armaments re-equipment
schedules. This information is combined with long-range
forecasts and mission analysis to generate the MENS-like
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document. NAPR is generally thought of as an element of the
Periodic Armaments Planning System.
It is interesting to note that phase 1 efforts
closely follow the system design process described in
section II. E. This is a significant fact and is discussed
further in section IV. B. The PAPS procedure formalizes the
process. Unlike past abortive efforts to generate common
NATO military needs and requirements, the PAPS procedure
attempts to bring the nations together at the beginning of
the system life cycle before irrevocable national decisions
are made. Finally, a positive method of providing user
feedback to the planning process exists in the NAPR. This
is a new approach for NATO and has yet to be proven.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF NATO ACTIVITIES
A. INTRODUCTION
The systems approach described in Chapter III shows how
decision-making can be accomplished to achieve standardiza-
tion in a logical way through superimposing the Hierarchy of
Standardization on system structures. It is the purpose of
this chapter to examine the activities of the CNAD and the
MAS to determine to what extent they are following the system
approach to achieve standardization. Special attention is
devoted to system interfaces and the manner in which they
are being addressed within the NATO organizations.
B. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT ACTIVITIES
1. Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD)
The objective of the current CNAD efforts is to
establish a framework in which it is easy for allies to col-
laborate in system acquisition and standardization. The CNAD
has been working very hard to improve its procedures. This is
accomplished through the Periodic Armaments Planning System
(PAPS). Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has stated that,
when fully implemented, the PAPS and related NATO planning
systems should include:
"(1) Timely development of NATO military requirements
documents which will guide the activities of the CNAD
and influence national weapons acquisition plans at an
early stage of their formulation.
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(2) A means to systematically prepare NATO acquisi-
tion strategies which form the basis for both
national and multinational programs to satisfy these
NATO needs.
(3) Management review procedures to assess progress
on cooperative programs at critical milestones and
monitor the degree to which harmonization is being
achieved Alliance-wide." [Ref. 5, p. 91]
In attempting to achieve standardization, the pri-
mary focus of the CNAD is in three areas
:
(1) For participating NATO nations to reach an
agreement on military requirements. This, ideally, should
include all NATO nations but less than unanimous agreement
is still satisfactory.
(2) For participating NATO nations to acquire common
systems to satisfy the needs and requirements of the indi-
vidual nations as well as NATO.
(3) For participating NATO nations to reach inter-
operability agreements in selected, high-priority areas.
In the area of establishing common military require-
ments the emphasis is on early communication of those require-
ments among the NATO Allies. Even so, differences in tactical
doctrine, technical capabilities and other factors may pre-
clude the NATO nations from being in close agreement on either
military requirements or system solutions. This can lead to
several difficulties.
If the nations find themselves unable to agree on
basic military requirements, then collaboration on systems
acquisition will be difficult to achieve and possibly not
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worth the effort. Any system obtained under this condition
may fail to meet the requirements of one or more nations
while possibly exceeding the requirements of others. Even
when agreement is reached on military needs there is no
assurance that the allies will be able to agree on which
system is optimum. Nor will they necessarily be able to
work out joint management responsibilities, funding, and
acquisition strategies. In addition, those nations which
drop out of active participation may elect to proceed on
their own or in a coalition with other nations.
Even with the potential difficulties listed above
some measure of success in acquisition of common systems has
been achieved. The Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS) program is a good example. According to Aviation
Week and Space Technology [Ref. 18, p. 89],
"The AWACS program is completely unique....
It is the first time NATO as an organization has
tried to define, develop, and purchase a complex
system, rather than having each member nation buy
the system and then assign it to NATO.
"In theory, the process was not complicated.
The NATO military staff, having decided that an
airborne early warning system was required to de-
tect low-flying aircraft that might try to penetrate
the airspace of NATO nations, was to have agreed on
a common system that then was to be funded by the
member nations on the basis of an agreed ratio."
Several problems have recently stalled the progress on
acquisition of AWACS as a NATO system. Nevertheless it
shows that common requirements and common acquis itition
processes are indeed possible to achieve.
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In addition to coordinating common military require-
ments and collaboration of systems acquisitions, the CNAD
is also active in achieving interoperability in selected,
high-priority areas. One example of this is the NATO Air
Armament Subgroup 16 on Aircraft Cross-servicing. Sub-
group 16 is pursuing a course which leads to progressively
greater degrees of interoperability of NATO TACAIR. Stage A
cross-servicing essentially allows an aircraft to refuel
and replenish other consumables (not weapons/stores) at
another NATO nation's airbase in order to get back to its
own base. Stage B carries the cross-servicing a significant
step further by providing for rearming of a limited selection
of weapons/stores. Stage B allows the aircraft of one NATO
nation to land at a different NATO nation's airbase and
replenish to a combat-ready status. Both stages A and B
have been implemented and have had considerable success.
Stage C is the final stage and involves not only refueling
and rearming but organizational level maintenance as well.
Subgroup 16 has been responsible for coordinating
all the activities leading to achievement of greater inter-
operability of aircraft, weapons/stores, and airbases between
the NATO nations. In so doing, it has been more concerned
with working out the interface problems with today's systems
and system elements and less concerned with establishing a
standardization framework for tomorrow's systems.
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Subgroup 9 on air-to-surface weapons and Subgroup 13
on air-to-air weapons are attempting to arrive at common
military requirements for the 1980' s. Both subgroups are
looking to the MAS to establish standards for system elements
and interfaces to support acquisition of common systems
[Ref. 19].
In summary, the CNAD is actively attempting to
promote common acquisition of systems among the NATO nations
and interoperability in those systems where common acquisi-
tion is not feasible. The Periodic Armaments Planning
System provides an excellent framework within which the
system design model, described in section II. E, may function.
However, the CNAD does not have a strong systems engineering
group to pull together all of the diverse system elements
and interfaces. Partly because of the lack of a systems
engineering organization, the CNAD does not take a systems
approach in solving its standardization problems.
2 . Military Agency for Standardization (MAS)
The objective of the MAS currently is to establish
common tactics, procedures, materials and interfaces between
systems and their elements. This objective is essentially
the same as when the organization was formed in 19 51. The
Standardization Agreement (STANAG) also continues as the
means by which the common agreements are documented. The
primary emphasis has been on setting standards for future
systems with a "no retrofit" clause written into each
76

STANAG. This meant that all future systems would abide by
the agreement but existing systems did not have to be changed
to comply. Recent concern over the lack of standardization in
NATO has resulted in elimination of the "no retrofit" clause.
The door is now open to standardize existing systems at least
to the degree of interoperability with new systems.
The MAS has come under considerable criticism over
the past several years. Even the official NATO publication,
NATO Facts and Figures
,
makes the statement:
"Consequently, although the Standardization Agreement
(STANAG) method is still used when need arises, it
no longer represents a major part of cooperative
efforts in the equipment field." [Ref. 13, p. 132]
The concern is that the MAS has not been effective in
achieving NATO-wide standardization. There are several
reasons for this apparent lack of effectiveness. The MAS
has achieved some low-level standardization in parts and
materials. However, no major system has ever been acquired
based on specifications derived from STANAGS [Ref. 15, p. 11].
There has been very little emphasis on standardization at
the higher system levels. In addition, the MAS, operating
within its charter, has no enforcement power. The NATO
nations accept and ratify or reject STANAGS on a strictly
voluntary basis [Ref. 20, p. 327]. In addition, compliance
after ratification has often been inconsistent, especially
if the STANAGS are not incorporated into military specifi-
cations and standards of the NATO nations. As a result,
77

few agreements are unanimous throughout NATO. In some cases,
STANAGS are not ratified by the nations even after agreement
is reached in MAS sessions [Ref. 21, p. 27].
The future of the MAS and the STANAG process is not
as bleak as the above discussion might indicate. Substan-
tial progress is being made in giving some authority to
the STANAG process. Recognizing the lack of authority and
enforcement power, the NATO nations have agreed to test a
new process for monitoring STANAG implementation. This
process is intended to provide NATO and the national author-
ties with feedback on the status of STANAG ratification and
implementation by each nation [Ref. 5, p. 83]. This should
certainly help strengthen the MAS and will aid considerably
in achieving standardization.
Even though the MAS is being given additional support,
this is occurring mainly in its administrative processes
and not so much in the substance and form of the standardi-
zation tasks. It is in this area that more attention is
needed. In particular, the MAS continues to reach standardi-
zation agreements at a low level. There is very little
higher system level coordination of the STANAGS.
There is one encouraging example of how an organiza-
tion within the MAS has broadened its view to include higher
system level considerations. The Air Force Board has been
very much concerned with the problem of interoperability of
aircraft and weapons/stores among those nations possessing
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a significant TACAIR capability. The Air Force Board
originally chartered the Air Armament Working Panel to work
out technical interface problems in connection with the cross
servicing of aircraft and weapons/stores. Table II is a
representative list of the type of STANAGS which resulted
from this early effort [Ref. 22, pp. A1-A8]. The primary
emphasis is on mechanical characteristics relative to the
carriage and release of conventional, non-guided weapons.
Some STANAGS exist for 20 mm and 30 mm aircraft guns and
bomb fuze safety requirements. There was no emphasis or
concern with the newer, more effective weapons. Stores such
as Maverick television-guided close support missile,
Harpoon anti-ship missile or any of the complex electronic
warfare pods and target designator pods were not addressed.
Within the last year, efforts have led to considera-
tion of interoperability of a broader range of weapons/stores
than just conventional bombs and 20 mm/30 mm ammunition.
Table III shows expansions into areas involving a much
higher degree of integration of complex weapons/stores with
the aircraft systems which must support them [Ref. 22,
pp. A1-A8] . It is of interest to note that the Air Armament
Working Panel was expanded into a new working panel which
included the Aircraft Instrumentation and Aircraft Electrical
Working Panels. This new panel has recently recommended




SAMPLE OF EARLY STANAGS
OF THE AIR ARMAMENT WORKING PANEL
STANAG NO
. TITLE
3231 AA ADEN and DEFA 30 mm Gun Barrel Chambers
3232 AA 30 mm Link for ADEN and DEFA Guns
3420 AA Photoflash Cartridges for Low-Altitude
Photography
3525 AA Design Safety Principles and General
Design Criteria for Airborne Fuzes
3556 AA Bomb Ejection Cartridges
3575 AA Requirements for Bomb Ejection Racks
3585 AA 20 mm Ammunition for Airborne Weapons
3605 AA Compatibility of Mechanical Fuzing
Systems and Arming Devices for Droppable
Stores
3635 AA Suspension Units with Release Capability
for Helicopters
3726 AA Bail Lugs for Suspension of Airborne
Stores





SAMPLE OF RECENT STANAGS OF
THE AIR ARMAMENT WORKING PANEL
STANAG or
STUDY NO.* TITLE
3841 AA Safety Aspects Arising from the Applica-
tion of Digital Data Bus Techniques to
Stores Management
3845 AA Display and Control Requirements Arising
from the Management of Aircraft Stores,
Internal Guns , and Dispensers
3839 AA Design Measures Required to Achieve
Flexible Organization of Software
3350 AA Standardized Video System for Electro
optically Guided Weapons
3840 AA Automatic Store Identification
3843 AA Size and Weight Standards for Aircraft
Stores Used on Fixed Wing Aircraft
3791 AA Selection of NATO Common Use Weapons
3785 AA Air-Ground Guided Weapon Interface
(Electrical and Mechanical)
*Study Number indicates that the item has not been approved
yet but is under consideration.
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as the Avionics Systems Integration and Architecture Working
Panel [Ref. 22, Annex F]
.
Even this broader view of the aircraft and weapons/
stores interoperability task has not yet included considera-
tion of such necessary elements as maintainability, logistic
support, tactical training, and more. It is, however, a
start in the right direction. An important observation is
that the expansion of Air Armament Panel task areas occurred
solely as the result of the realization by the panel members
of the need to do so. There was no initial direction by
higher authorities to move into higher level considerations.
There is no reason to believe that other working parties
will be so fortunate as to recognize their limitations and
the need to expand their efforts and their thinking. Here-
in lies the basic problem with the MAS. As in the CNAD,
the MAS does not have a systems engineering organization to
aid in structuring systems to help make decisions or to
advise the different working panels. There is no deliberate
emphasis on taking a systems approach to achieving standardi-
zation.
The importance of the MAS activities was underscored
by Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles W. Duncan in testimony
before the House Subcommittee on Problems in the Standardiza-
tion and Interoperability of NATO Military Equipment:
"Our Proposal will call for NATO mission element
need statements --to pave the way for cooperative
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development and standardization agreements (Stanags)
governing equipment designs to insure needed inter-
operability." [Ref. 23, p. 8]
3. CNAD and MAS Coordination
The only formal communication link between the CNAD
and the MAS is through the National Armaments Directors
Representatives (NADREPS)
. The NADREPS, which consists
of senior CNAD staff members, handles all the routine exchange
of information on activities status and decisions reached.
However, discussions with members of CNAD subgroups and MAS
working panels give indication that the exchange of informa-
tion is not as effective as needed to accomplish standardiza-
tion goals. There is some evidence, based on these discussions,
that the difficulty may be the fact that the CNAD is a
civilian organization whereas the MAS is a military organi-
zation. There is a natural and usually healthy gap between
military and civilian sides of defense-oriented organizations.
This helps keep a checks and balances arrangement between
the two. Unfortunately the gap can sometimes be detrimental
to good communications. Regardless of its effectiveness, it
is safe to say that good exchange of information between
CNAD and MAS is essential to achievement of standardization
C. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS
The basic problem of both the CNAD and the MAS is the
lack of a total systems approach. This is particularly
evident when comparing current CNAD and MAS activities with
the system design model and system life cycle as shown
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in Figure 13. Figure 13 is a matrix illustrating how the
system design model for decision-making applies at all phases
of a system life cycle. The system life cycle is divided
into three distinct periods. The planning period is primarily
conducted by the users. Users are defined as the military
and civilian officials and organizations responsible for
establishing military requirements. The acquisition period
is the responsibility of the producers. Producers are
defined as the people and organizations (both government
and private industry) who develop and produce systems to
satisfy requirements. The use period represents the in-
service life of a system. It has long been considered
critical that the users and the producers maintain a close
dialogue. The users tell the producers what is needed
operationally. The producers tell the users what they can
have system wise. The CNAD is attempting to establish the
PAPS as a framework which will allow decision-making to
occur throughout the system life cycle. However, the pri-
mary focus has been on developing operational requirements
and establishing common needs. This is certainly a
necessary step but reflects mainly the kinds of activities
which occur during the conceptual formulation and system
definition phases of the life cycle as shown in Figure 13.
This involves the user side of NATO, both civilian officials
of the CNAD and the NATO Military Authorities (NMA) . The
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life cycle except as a monitor of individual and collabora-
tive national efforts. In addition, the CNAD activities are
not generally conducted in accordance with the system design
model. The primary deficiency of the CNAD is in its lack of
a total system approach for standardization decision-making
at all life cycle phases.
The iMAS, on the other hand, conducts its activities
along entirely different lines. The hardware STANAGS, when
fully ratified, are intended to support the detail design
of systems which will be used in the NATO environment. In
fact, no major system has ever been procured based on STANAGS
[Ref. 3, p. 7]. The MAS also develops STANAGS related more
closely to operational procedures and tactics. As with the
CNAD, the MAS activities do not follow the systems design
model in decision-making. With a few exceptions, the MAS
conducts its activities at a low, detail level without
considering the total system. Figure 13 shows how the hard-
ware standards are intended to support detail design and the
procedures standards support military operations.
The CNAD and the MAS need to recognize that making
decisions and reaching agreements on standardization is a
system problem. Solutions cannot be offered without con-
sideration of their impact on all levels of a system and
throughout the life cycle. Both organizations need to
recognize that a hierarchy of standardization exists and has
an impact on the decision-making process. The CNAD and the
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MAS need to strengthen and formalize application of systems
engineering to include total systems considerations. They
need to be concerned with establishing agreements on inter-
faces between system elements at all levels. The STANAG
process is well suited to this and only needs to be applied
to systems from the top level downward rather than begin
and stay at the lower levels.
The CNAD and the MAS perform complimentary functions and
need to work more closely together in a true user-producer
dialogue. By so doing, they can perform all of the functions
of the system engineering methodology shown in Figure 15.
Not only can they mutually assist each other during the early
phases of planning and acquisition but through the rest of
the system life cycle as well.
In summary, it is apparent from examining Figure 13 that
there is no organization within NATO which is concerned with
all phases and activities of the system life cycle. The
CNAD concentrates its efforts during concept formulation
and somewhat during system definition whereas the MAS is
concerned about relatively low-level matters in support of
detail design. NATO needs to restructure its efforts to
accomplish standardization within a broad system engineering
framework throughout the entire life cycle and to do so in
the most cost-effective manner pos sible.
Although the thrust of this thesis is on standardization,
there is a need to apply the same thinking to all other system
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related tasks in order to make tradeoffs among system design,




V. SYNTHESIS, ANALYSIS AND
EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVES
A. INTRODUCTION
In chapter IV, the current activities of the NATO
standardization organizations were analyzed and deficiencies
were discussed. In particular, it was determined that neither
the CNAD nor the MAS takes a total systems viewpoint regarding
standardization decision-making over the entire system life
cycle. In addition, there is a lack of user-producer communi-
cation between the CNAD, the MAS, and other NATO organizations
In this chapter, synthesis, analysis, and evaluation of
alternative solutions to these deficiencies are presented.
The system design model, the decision-making method described
in chapter II, is used to arrive at a recommended solution.
See Ref. 24, chapter 4, for a detailed discussion of the
application of decision theory as applied to the systems
design model
.
B. SYSTEM DESIGN MODEL APPLIED TO CNAD AND MAS
1. Problem Formulation
Formulation of the problem consists of, first,
redefining the deficiencies in terms of requirements and,
second, establishing a list of criteria by which alternative





The purpose of requirements is to set up guide-
lines which can be used to develop alternative solutions
to deficiencies. The requirement, in this case, is to
restructure the NATO standardization efforts in such a way
as to
:
.Establish a total systems engineering framework
.Consider the impact of standardization over the
entire system life cycle
.Use the system design model as a tool for standardi-
zation decision-making
.Establish an effective user-producer dialogue
between the appropriate NATO organizations
b. Criteria
Criteria are the specific parameters which are
relevant to the evaluation, comparison, and selection of
one alternative over another. Three main criteria are of
interest in this example. They are, in decreasing order of
priority, effectiveness, communication, and resources.
Effectiveness refers to the benefits of implementing the
systems approach to standardization throughout the life
cycle. Communication refers to the exchange of information
on standardization requirements, capabilities and status
between users and producers. In terms of priority, communi-
cation is nearly at an equal level with effectiveness.
Resources is a measure of the cost and impact of implementing
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a particular alternative solution. Each criterion is assigned
a weighting number according to its priority and value
relative to the others on a 100% scale. Effectiveness is
rated at .45 (451), communication is rated .40 (40%), and
resources is rated at .15 (15%). These weightings will be
used in the evaluation of analysis results in section B.4
of this chapter.
Each of the three main criteria is further
divided into more detailed supportive parameters. The
complete list of criteria is shown below.
.Effectiveness
.External control - Ability to direct and enforce
systems approach on standardiza-
tion decision-making throughout
the applicable NATO organization
and over all system life cycle
phases
.
.Internal control - Ability to maintain control of
resources needed to conduct
systems engineering activities.
.Continuity - Degree of stability of personnel in
remaining part of the systems engineer-
ing organization or process over a long
period of time.
.Uniformity - Degree to which the systems approach is
applied in the same way throughout the
concerned NATO organizations.
.Span of control - Degree to which higher authority
may have to expand span of control




.User-producer dialogue - Ability to promote free ex-






.Subgrop dialogue - Ability to promote communication
between and within CNAD subgroups.
.Working panel dialogue - Ability to promote communi-
cation between and within
MAS working panels.
. Resources
.Cost - Incremental cost resulting from additional
personnel and facilities required to support
systems engineering activities.
.Reorganization - Degree to which NATO organizations
need to be restructured to conduct
systems engineering activities.
.Duplication of effort - Degree to which more than
one organization is conducting
systems engineering activities
2. Synthesis of Alternative Solutions
There are a number of ways for introducing systems
engineering into the CNAD and the MAS. Six of these are
listed below and defined in the following paragraphs.
.Alternative 1 - No organizational change
.Alternative 2 - Systems engineering within functional
organizations
.Alternative 3 - Dual matrix organization
.Alternative 4 - Single matrix organization assigned
to CNAD
.Alternative 5 - Single matrix organization assigned
to MAS
.Alternative 6 - Independent matrix organization
a. Alternative 1 - No Organizational Change
The first alternative is to leave both the CNAD
and the MAS unchanged and simply introduce systems engineering
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as a new methodology. The tasks to accomplish systems
engineering would be carried out using existing personnel
and organizational structures.
b. Alternative 2 - Systems Engineering within
Functional Organizations
The second alternative is illustrated in
Figure 14. Each CNAD group and each MAS service board would
establish a separate systems engineering subgroup or working
panel. The members of each subgroup/working panel would
consist of national delegates from each participating NATO
nation. The delegates' activities would focus on standardi-
zation matters within the cognizance and interest of the
particular group or service board. Coordination of these
subgroups/working panels would be directed by the CNAD and
MAS committees and their staffs. This is similar to a
classical functional organization in that directors from
the CNAD and MAS committees would be minimal with the sub-
groups/working panels cooperating to get the job done.
c. Alternative 3 - Dual Matrix Organization
Alternative 3 is a matrix organization with the
systems engineering activities as the program managers and
the subgroups/working panels as functional entities. The
subgroups/working panels would carry out their activities
under the direction of the systems engineering staff, which
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Figure 15 depicts the third alternative. The
systems engineering function has now been elevated to a
higher position in the CNAD and the MAS. The organization
would consist of permanent, duplicate staffs, each of which
performs similar kinds of activities and tasks within its
parent organization.
In this position each systems engineering activity
would have responsibility for overall coordination of the
groups and service boards, respectively. Along with this
responsibility would be a greater degree of systems engineer-
ing authority over the functional groups and service boards.
This is a result of the systems engineering activities close
connection with the CNAD and MAS committees.
In order to maintain close working relationships,
it would be necessary to assign one person as needed from
the systems engineering activity to each CNAD group and MAS
service board. This would help ensure full harmony and
coordination of standardization activities among the various
national representatives.
d. Alternative 4 - Single Matrix Organization
Assigned to CNAD
The fourth alternative is simply a consolidation
of the third alternative. As shown in Figure 16, this alter-
native eliminates the systems engineering activity from the
MAS. All activities would be accomplished by a single systems
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the duplicative organizations in alternative 3. This one
activity would coordinate and direct the standardization
activities of both the CNAD and the MAS. In all other
respects the responsibility and authority of the staff would
be the same in alternative 3.
e. Alternative 5 - Single Matrix Organization
Assigned to MAS
Alternative 5 is the same as alternative 4
except that the systems engineering activity would be
located in the MAS rather than the CNAD. Activities would
be similar to alternative 3 with the staff giving direction
to both the CNAD subgroups and the MAS working panels.
f. Alternative 6 - Independent Matrix Organization
This alternative shown in Figure 17, separates
the systems engineering activity from the direct authority
of either the CNAD or the MAS. This independent matrix
organization would conduct essentially the same activities
as alternatives 3, 4, and 5 but with more direct decision
authority and coordination. Several possibilities exist
but the most likely is to place this activity under the
Defense Support Division of the NATO International staff
(see Figure 9). The Defense Support Division is a high-level,
permanent international staff which concerns itself with











































































































3. Analysis of Alternative Solutions
The analysis of the six alternative solutions will
provide information on the advantages and disadvantages of
each. The analysis will be based on the criteria and
supportive parameters discussed in section B.l of this
chapter. Each alternative will be analyzed for advantages,
disadvantages, and no effect relative to the current NATO
approach for each supportive parameter.
a. Alternative 1
Advantages
.No reorganization is needed. A possible rewrite
of charters and procedures may be required.
.Cost is low. There is a minimal investment of
additional personnel and facilities.
No effect
.External control is no different since
organizations are unchanged.
.Internal control of systems engineering activities
is unchanged.
.Span of control is unchanged.
.User-producer dialogue remains difficult to
accomplish but no worse than current approaches.
.Communications between CNAD subgroups and MAS
working panels is insufficient for good coordina-




.Constant change in composition of subgroups/
working panels and their personnel results in
loss of continuity.
.Difficult for CNAD and MAS to maintain uniform
systems engineering policies over entire system
life cycle. This is due, primarily, to lack
of full-time commitment.
.The CNAD and the MAS have duplicative functions
and are therefore less efficient.
Alternative 2
Advantages
.No reorganization is required. System engineering
subgroups and working panels are formed routinely.
.Group and subgroup dialogue is enhanced since the
systems engineering subgroup is directly involved
in activities.
.Service board and working panel dialogue is
enhanced since systems engineering working panel
is directly involved in activities.
.Cost is low. Subgroups and working panels are
made up of national delegates and, thus, NATO
personnel and facilities expenses are low.
No effect
.Span of control is unchanged for both the CNAD




.No external control of other subgroups/working
panels, except as the groups, service boards, and
CNAD/MAS committees allow.
.National delegates are constantly changing.
There is no internal control of the selection
of qualified personnel assigned to the systems
engineering subgroups and working panels. No
adequate control of implementation of systems
engineering methods.
.Continuity of activities suffers because of
constant movement of personnel on the subgroups/
working panels
.
•Uniformity is hard to achieve because of the
large number of organizations all attempting to
accomplish the same thing but using different pro^
cedures . No central control.
.Systems engineering subgroups/working panels are
at too low a level within NATO to effectively
direct user-producer dialogue. Large number of
additional subgroups/working panels may actually
hinder coordination of user-producer dialogue.
.High degree of duplication of effort because of






.Adequate external control of standardization
activities with authority to direct and enforce
decisions
.
.Permanent systems engineering activities allows
internal control over selection of qualified
personnel and adequate control of procedures for
implementation of systems engineering methods.
.Permanent systems engineering activities allows
continuity of tasks and procedures over entire
life cycle.
.The user-producer dialogue is easier to achieve
because relatively high-level activities are
directing it.
.CNAD subgroups and MAS working panels are
communicating better because the systems engineer-
ing activities are directing and coordinating them
No effect
.Uniformity of procedures and methods is better
than alternatives 1 and 2 but still split between
CNAD and MAS systems engineering activities.
Disadvantages
.Reorganization of the CNAD and MAS will have to





.Cost is high because of need to support two
full-time, permanent activities.
.Duplicate activities are less efficient.
.Span of control is a bit more of a problem for
the CNAD and MAS committees,
d. Alternative 4
Advantages
.Adequate external control of standardization
activities with authority to direct and enforce
decisions. Full control exists over the CNAD
subgroups with somewhat less control over the
MAS working panels. However, the overall
authority of the CNAD lends considerable
weight to alternative 4.
.A permanent systems engineering activity allows
internal control over selection of qualified
personnel and adequate control of procedures for
implementation of the systems engineering methods.
.A permanent systems engineering activity allows
continuity of tasks and procedures over entire
system life cycle.
.There is uniformity of procedures and methods
because a single systems engineering activity is
in control.
.The user-producer dialogue is easier to achieve be-
cause a single activity is coordinating communications
104

.CNAD subgroups communicate under the direction
of the systems engineering activity. MAS working
panels also communicate but to a lesser extent.
.A single systems engineering activity is more
efficient because of no duplication of effort.
No effect
.Span of control is slightly larger for the
CNAD committee. No effect on the MAS committee.
Disadvantages
.Reorganization of the CNAD will have to occur
to accommodate the systems engineering activity.
The MAS will have to restructure procedures to
allow direction by the activity.
.The cost is high because of the need to maintain
a permanent, full-time staff. However, cost is
lower than with the duplicate activity.
Alternative 5
Advantages
.Adequate external control of standardization
activities. Somewhat less authority to direct
and enforce decisions because of relatively low
position of the MAS within the NATO organization,
at least as compared with the CNAD.
.A permanent systems engineering activity allows
internal control over selection of qualified
personnel and adequate control of procedures
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for implementation of the systems engineering
methods
.
.A permanent systems engineering activity allows
continuity of tasks and procedures over entire
system life cycle.
.There is full uniformity of procedures and
methods because a single systems engineering
activity is in control.
.The user-producer dialogue is enhanced but
still needs closer ties to the requirements
determination process.
.iMAS working panels communicate well under
direction of the systems engineering activity.
The CNAD subgroups also communicate but to a
lesser extent.
.A single systems engineering activity is more
efficient because of no duplication of effort.
No effect
.Span of control is slightly larger for the MAS
committee. No effect on the CNAD committee.
Disadvantages
.Reorganization of the MAS will have to occur to
accommodate the systems engineering activity. The
CNAD will have to restructure procedures to allow
direction by the activity.
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.The cost is high because of the need to maintain
a permanent, full-time staff. However, cost is
lower than with the duplicative activity,
f. Alternative 6
Advantages
.Full external control of standardization activi-
ties with authority to direct and enforce decisions
Full control over CNAD subgroups and MAS working
panels.
.A permanent systems engineering activity allows
internal control over selection of qualified
personnel and adequate control of procedures for
implementation of the systems engineering methods.
.A permanent systems engineering activity allows
continuity of tasks and procedures over entire
system life cycle.
.There is full uniformity of procedures and
methods because a single systems engineering
activity is in control.
.The user-producer dialogue is easier to achieve
because a single activity is coordinating
communications
.
.CNAD subgroups and iMAS working panels are
communicating under the direction and coordina-
tion of the systems engineering activity.
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.A single systems engineering activity is more
efficient because of no duplication of effort.
No effect
.Span of control has been removed from the CNAD
and MAS committees but still exists at a higher
level.
Disadvantages
.A relatively large reorganization will have to
occur to accommodate the systems engineering
activity. This will occur outside the confines of
the CNAD and MAS.
.The cost of maintaining a relatively large
systems engineering activity will be high.
4. Evaluation of Alternative Systems
a. Evaluation Method
Evaluation consists of listing the advantages
and disadvantages of each alternative for each criterion
parameter on a comparative basis. Table IV illustrates how
this is done. Each criterion and supporting paramater is
shown along with a weighting value as described in section B.l
of this chapter. The alternative solutions are arranged in
columns 1 through 6. The advantages, no effect, and disad-
vantages described in subjective terms in the preceding
section are quantified into numerical ratings with values





CRITERION PARAMETERS 1 2 3 4 5 6
EXTERNAL CONTROL 3 2 4 5 4 5
INTERNAL CONTROL 3 1 5 rb 5 5
:tiveness
).4S
CONTINUITY 1 1 5 5 5 5




UJ REORGANIZATION 5 4 2 2 2 1
SPAN OF CONTROL 3 3 3 3 3 3






USER -PRODUCER DIALOGUE 3 2 4 5 4 S
UNICA
.40 SUBGROUP DIALOGUE 3 5 5 5 4 4
s o
o
u ^ WORKING PANEL DIALOGUE 3 5 5 4 <- 4
S PARAMETERS





COST 5 5 1 2 ? 1
DUPLICATION OF EFFORT 2 1 1 4 4 4
SUBSCORE - .15 x Z PARAMETERS .525 .45 .15 .45 .45 .38
TOTAL RATING (Z SUBSCORES 3.0 2.95 3.67 4.2 3.98 3.91
RATINGS
MOST ADVANTAGEOUS = 5
SOMEWHAT ADVANTAGEOUS = 4
NO EFFECT » 5
SOMEWHAT DISADVANTAGEOUS = 2
MOST DISADVANTAGEOUS =» 1
TABLE IV
EVALUATION SCORING OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
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.Most advantageous - 5
.Somewhat advantageous - 4
.No effect or indifferent - 3
.Somewhat disadvantageous - 2
.Most disadvantageous - 1
Each parameter is assigned a rating for each of the alterna-
tives. An average is taken of the parameters within each
criterion. This average is then multiplied by the particular
criterion weighting to obtain a criterion weighted average.
The weighted averages (there are three for the three criteria)
are summed up to obtain an overall rating for that particular
alternative solution. The remaining alternatives are evaluated
the same way. Reference 25 presents a detailed discussion of
this method of evaluation.
The distribution of ratings, shown in Table IV,
are the author's judgments. Other evaluators may assign
different ratings and the result may be somewhat different.
However, it is suggested that the end result will be
essentially the same [Ref. 26].
b. Evaluation Results
Alternatives 1 and 2 do not offer any significant
advantage over the current NATO approaches to standardization.
Alternative 3 offers some increased effectiveness and communi-
cations but suffers from high cost and duplication of effort.
Alternatives 4, 5, and 6 offer the highest degree of effective-
ness and communications but require additional resources
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due to the need for a permanent systems engineering activity
with accompanying personnel and facilities. Duplication of
effort is eliminated.
Of the three acceptable alternatives, number 6 is
lowest even though it exhibits a considerably higher degree
of external control of systems engineering activities. The
lower score is a result of the need for considerable reorgani-
zation at fairly high levels within NATO and the higher cost
associated with a permanent activity.
Alternatives 4 and 5 exhibit the same trends
in reorganization and cost as alternative 6 but to a lesser
degree. Therefore, their scores are higher. The score for
alternative 4, the systems engineering activity attached to
the CNAD, is the higher of the two. This is a result of a
more effective user-producer dialogue and a greater degree
of external control of standardization activities. The
CNAD has generally been more involved in establishing military
needs and requirements and defining alternative systems to
suit those needs through a user-producer dialogue. The CNAD
seems to have a little more concern with the system life
cycle, at least during the critical early phases. In
addition, the CNAD has a more direct line of authority to
the North Atlantic Council as well as ties to the various
national defense ministries. The effect is to transfer
some of the authority and influence of the CNAD to the systems
engineering activity. This, in turn, affects the ability
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to control all the organizations involved in standardization
decision -making.
C. DECISION
If NATO is willing to undergo a relatively major
reorganization and is able to bear the cost of a large systems
engineering activity, then alternative 6 is recommended as
most effective. If alternative 6 is not feasible, then
alternative 4 is recommended as the best compromise between
effectiveness and usage of resources. The CNAD has all the
necessary basic attributes for making decisions on standardi-
zation of NATO systems. The addition of a system engineering
activity, as recommended in alternative 4, will strengthen
the technical basis on which decisions are made and result
in more emphasis on the viewpoint of the producers.
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VII. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The increased threat from strengthened Warsaw Pact
forces combined with recognition of the inability of NATO
forces to cooperate fully in combat has caused much emphasis
to be placed on the need for standardization of equipment,
procedures, tactics, and doctrine. The result of this has
been interest in the development of new procedures, such
as PAPS, by which the NATO nations may decide which systems
need to be standardized. These procedures are a considerable
improvement over past methods.
Further improvements, however, can be made. NATO needs
to recognize that a hierarchy of standardization exists and
that it can be combined with systems engineering methods.
The end result will be a more rational, coordinated approach
to standardization decision-making. NATO also needs to be
prepared to reorganize, not only to aid in making standardiza
tion decisions, but to manage and support the development,
production, and operational use of systems over their entire
life cycle.
Following is a summary list of the main conclusions
in this thesis
:
.A hierarchy of standardization has been developed and
can be used to help make standardization decisions.
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.The systems approach offers a rational means for
decision-making whereby all relevant information is
considered and weighed.
.The system design model is a generally applicable tool
by which the systems approach may be implemented.
.It is most important to consider the impact of standard!
zation during the planning phases of the system life cycle.
This should be used as a guide to standardization efforts in
all other phases.
.Interfaces between system elements are critical. If
these are not well understood then the higher degrees of
standardization will be difficult to achieve.
.Neither the CNAD nor the MAS use a systems approach
in standardization decision-making.
.The CNAD and the MAS perform complementary functions
but do not communicate well.
.The MAS is a good organization for establishing inter-
face standardization but currently is active only at lower
system levels.
.The CNAD has the necessary atrributes to be an effective
systems engineering organization. It only needs to consoli-
date its efforts on a more formal basis.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are made:
.Introduce a systems engineering framework as a way of
making decisions on standardization issues. Broaden the
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systems perspective of all the CNAD subgroups and MAS
working panels so they can see the impact of their efforts
on other systems and system elements.
.Establish a permanent systems engineering activity
with a charter to implement the systems approach throughout
the CNAD and the MAS. Give the staff enough authority to






Concept Formulation - This is the initial phase of the
system lite cycle in which efforts are directed toward
identifying and evaluating the feasibility of operational
requirements
.
Form. Fit. Function . - Terms used to describe the three
primary attributes ot a system. Form describes the shape
of a system, equipment, or component. Fit describes how well
it interfaces with other systems, equipment, or components.
Function describes the operation and performance of the
system, equipment, or component.
FRG - Federal Republic of Germany, also known, informally, as
West Germany.
IFF - Identification Friend or Foe. Equipment installed in
all combat aircraft which, when interrogated by another
aircraft, identifies itself as friendly. No reply or an
improperly coded reply would warn the other aircraft of
possible enemy intrusion.
Laser Seeker - One form of PGM component wherein a target
is illuminated by a laser (ground or airborne) and a seeker,
mounted on the weapon, detects and homes on reflected laser
energy from the target.
NATO Nations - All the member nations of the NATO alliance.
This includes Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece,
West Germany (FRG), Iceland, Italy, Luxemborg, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States.
Of these fifteen, France and Greece have withdrawn from the
military alliance but remain active in all other NATO
affairs. Iceland has no military force. This leaves twelve
nations in an armed alliance as of spring 1979.
NMA - NATO Military Authorities. These are the top military
positions of the operating forces and are represented by four
NATO commands along with their staffs. These commands come
under the Military Committee and consist of the Supreme
Allied Commander, Europe, the Supreme Allied Commander,
Atlantic, the Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group, and the
Allied Commander in Chief, Channel.
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PGM - Precision Guided Munitions. This term represents a
generic class of aircraft-delivered weapons which have been
developed during the last decade. They are characterized by
sophisticated internal mechanisms, complex interfaces with
aircraft systems, and exceptional performance (range,
accuracy, velocity, etc.).
Planning Period - The period of a system life cycle during
which concept formulation and system definition take place.
Rearm - The act of replacing an aircraft's weapons.
Refuel - The act of replenishing an aircraft with fuel and
other consumable supplies.
SACEUR - Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. The top command
of all NATO forces in Europe.
System Definition - This is the second phase of the system
life cycle. Technical plans and operational requirements
are further refined in light of more detailed information
regarding technical, economic, and financial feasibility.
System Life Cycle - The entire period of time during which
a system is in existence. Extends from military require-
ments determination through concept formulation, definition,
development, production, usage, and phase-out.
TACAIR - Tactical Air. All components of the air forces used
to support local or regional military operations. TACAIR is
typically used to provide air superiority, close support of
ground troops, interdiction and deep strike at supply depots,
transportation lines, etc.
Weapons/stores - Any item which is attached to an aircraft
which is not part of the aircraft fixed configuration. A
weapon or other store may or may not be ejected or launched
during a routine mission; however, it may always be easily
attached or removed on the ground and usually is. This
definition includes bombs, external fuel tanks, guided
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